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Abstract 
This article explores the genocide recognition politics (GRP) with a specific focus on Saddam 
Hussein’s Anfal campaign (1988) against the Kurdish population in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
(KRI). In the context of a pending referendum on independence in the KRI, this study 
investigates the evolution of GRP in relation to secession, nation-building and commemoration 
as well as the social, political and economic drivers in the process. In addition, the study zeroes 
in on the internationalization of genocide recognition claims via diaspora lobbying and the 
KRG’s bureaux of representation in Europe. The results are based on extensive fieldwork 
conducted with KRG representatives, diaspora entrepreneurs and other stakeholders between 
2012 and 2016 in Europe and Iraqi Kurdistan. The KRG’s genocide recognition claims are not 
explicitly associated with secession, but instead are employed to legitimize local rule by 
referencing collective trauma and shared victimhood. In this way, Anfal – as the ‘chosen trauma’ 
– has become a component of (local) nation-building mechanisms. Nevertheless, recognition 
claims can become instrumentalized for succession so long as the political circumstances in the 
region become favourable to Kurdish independence. In the diaspora context, the GRP serve to 
establish a link to homeland through commemoration practices, but they also provide greater 
space for lobbying and transnational advocacy networking.  
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Introduction 
The issue of genocide definition and recognition takes place in a thorny terrain of politics and 
power; recognition not only entails questions of justice, forgiveness and eventual reconciliation in 
cases of conflictual inter-ethnic relations but also those of liability, remunerations and political 
claims-making. Actors engaging in genocide recognition (hereafter GRP) can be ethnic or religious 
groups who make claims to national or host society parliaments, or to supra-national institutions’ 
assemblies and courts (such as the European Court of Human Rights). At times, secessionist groups 
have become actors in GRP, as has been the case with the Tamils in Sri Lanka.1 States have also 
pursued such initiatives, as Azerbaijan has in demanding recognition of the Khodjali massacre.2 In 
addition, diaspora organizations have used a range of (political) strategies to secure 
acknowledgement of a particular massacre or a set of massacres as genocide and to some extent 
have contributed to the internationalization of genocide recognition claims.3 For instance, the 
lobbying of the Armenian government and intense mobilization within its diaspora has kept the 
issue of recognition at the forefront of parliamentary agendas in European countries, United States 
and elsewhere.4 
In this paper, we examine the politics of genocide recognition engaged in by members of the 
Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq (KRG), including members of the KRG bureaux of 
representation in Europe, and of the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora in Europe. The focus of the GRP we 
explore is the campaign to achieve recognition of the Anfal campaign orchestrated by Saddam 
Hussein’s regime as genocide. While it has long featured high on the KRG’s political agenda and 
mobilized diaspora organizations across Europe, the issue has drawn little scholarly interest. Both 
the KRG and Kurdish diaspora organizations have appealed to governments as well as 
supranational institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union to have Anfal 
campaign recognized as genocide. Furthermore, the diaspora’s active lobbying efforts, coordinated 
to some extent with the KRG representation offices, have contributed to the internationalization of 
such genocide recognition claims. As a result, Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom 
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recognized Anfal as genocide in 2012–2013. On the other hand, considering that the KRG has 
expressed its intention to hold an independence referendum in the near future5, examining the role 
genocide recognition efforts play as part of ‘earned sovereignty’ claims has now become more 
topical than ever. As the KRG’s official Kurdish narrative concerning the Anfal campaign has 
significant political dimensions in terms of the disputed areas within Iraq6, it becomes all the more 
important to scrutinise the formulation of such claims and the eventual political ramifications they 
might have. How are the claims for genocide recognition of the Anfal campaign formulated? What 
economic, political and social drivers fuel the formulation of such politics? How do they relate to 
the question of secession, nation-building processes and commemoration? 
The material for this study consists of more than a hundred semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Germany, France, Sweden, United Kingdom, the Netherlands as well as in the KRI 
with actors that have lobbied for the recognition of Anfal as a genocide. 7 These include members of 
parliament in the KRG and officials in their bureaux of representation, members of diaspora 
organizations affiliated with the ruling parties, and other stakeholders in host countries. The 
interviewees included, among others, the KRG Head of Foreign Relations, Chief of Staff of the 
Parliament in KRG, Kurdish Democratic Party’s (KDP8) Head of Foreign Relations Office as well 
as KRG representatives to France and the United Kingdom. The empirical data also includes rich 
observation material collected at political and cultural events, demonstrations, and during 
parliamentary discussions and debates. KRG’s official documents and declarations have also been 
analyzed as part of the research material. In the following sections, we will first discuss the 
phenomenon of genocide recognition politics, then provide a contextualization of the Anfal 
campaign, and finally discuss how the GRP were formulated in the research material. 
 
Politics of Genocide Recognition: Drivers and Motivating Factors  
The topic of GRP is a relatively understudied. Although several academic studies refer to 
ethnic communities lobbying to achieve genocide recognition, it is rarely the subject of focused 
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research. The few cases that explicitly focus on lobbying strategies and practices towards genocide 
recognition include those of Maja Catic,9 who examines genocide recognition initiatives in the case 
of massive deportations and massacres of Circassians by Tsarist Russia in late nineteenth century. A 
little-known issue prior to the twenty-first century, the Circassians managed to bring their genocide 
recognition initiatives to the forefront after the 2007 decision by the International Olympic 
Committee to hold the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Catic shows that the timing of the Games, 
which ensured maximum visibility for recognition claims concerning massacres that had taken 
place more than a century prior. 
It has been shown that the political context shapes the formulation of GRP, most notably in 
questions of diplomatic relations, liability and reconciliation. For instance, genocide recognition by 
the perpetrating side can have significant consequences for inter-ethnic relations, as became evident 
in the Rwandan case.10 On the other hand, genocide recognition demands can create friction in 
diplomatic relations and consequently become a contested political issue in geopolitical power 
relations. When made towards a foreign state they can also raise questions of liability in case the 
foreign state in question has conducted arms deals with the perpetrating actor. Whereas the KRG’s 
claims for recognition of Anfal as genocide have not destabilized inter-ethnic relations within Iraq, 
they have raised questions on liability and diplomatic relations outside the country.  
The attitudes of the international community or the perpetrators towards genocide 
recognition claims shape the dynamics and repertoires of mobilization for actors engaging in the 
GRP. This is, for instance, visible in the case of the Armenian genocide that has become a highly 
politicized issue. It has been widely recognised internationally, partially due to Armenian diaspora 
groups’ lobbying efforts, but remains a highly contested issue in Turkey to this day.11 Therefore, it 
is plausible that in cases when genocide recognition claims have been to some extent successful and 
acknowledged by both international as well as domestic actors, (diaspora) activities focus more on 
remembrance and commemoration practices. In case of partial or no recognition by the international 
community and homeland actors, recognition claims can become quickly politicized. This does not 
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rule our commemoration practices, which can in some cases even provide opportunities to take part 
in increased strategic activism. Commemoration events can provide means to foster networks with 
political actors and to engage in transnational advocacy that enables to exercise leverage both in 
home and host country politics. 
This is closely related to the nexus between self-determination (and secession) and genocide 
recognition. For instance, Grodsky12 argues that secessionist groups might engage in ‘global 
sympathy campaigns’ and employ genocide claims to push further any self-determination claims. 
He finds evidence demonstrating that genocide recognition claims can be instrumentalized for the 
purposes of self-determination: claims for genocide recognition can have a broader effect, and be 
employed as ‘a strategic weapon in the quest of independence demands’ long after the fighting has 
ended. Catic13 suggests that ‘genocide discourses represent the most authoritative moral claims a 
group can make’, whereas according to Grodsky,14 the leverage of the term helps ethnic or religious 
groups to transform victimhood to an advantage that can be used to bargain. Similarly, in the case 
of Iraqi Kurdistan, Hadji15 argues that ‘self-determination trumps territorial integrity when a 
country has; (1) violated the “economic, social and cultural development” of a people […] In the 
case of genocide, territorial integrity yields to self-determination’. Indeed, ‘genocide’ is a powerful 
term that can both serve the purposes of nation(-state) building as well as enhance self-
determination rights.16 
GRP can also have a more symbolic and identity-based dimension.. For instance, Catic17 
argues that ‘the genocide recognition initiative is an identity-driven project, resulting from a fear of 
extinction that grows out of the experience of being a vulnerable ethno-national group, living with 
memories of deportations, exile and fragmentation’. GRP can become a component of the narrative 
of collective identity, building on collective memory and experience. Anderson Paul18 has studied 
the grassroot mobilizations of Armenian-Americans towards genocide recognition in the United 
States. She suggests that in the case of the lobbying efforts of the Armenian diaspora, genocidal 
memory provides a potent cohesive group ideology for Armenian-Americans, whereas religious 
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organizations have provided an important organizational basis for mobilization. Genocide 
recognition claims and how they are formulated draw from identity narratives and collective 
memory, and the representation of particular traumatic events as emblematic are often highly 
politically contested. 
In this article, we define GRP broadly to include the lobbying of governments, inter-
parliamentary groups and policy-makers at the local and international arena; mobilising diaspora 
organizations, NGOs and governmental institutions towards the recognition of particular 
massacre(s) as genocide: as well as actions that aim to raise awareness through commemoration 
events, performances, artefacts and demonstrations in the host and homeland context. Diaspora and 
homeland actors often coordinate efforts in genocide recognition initiatives, although the distinction 
between the host and home society, and between state actors and diaspora is not clear-cut, 
particularly concerning overseas bureaux of representation and diaspora organizations that are 
affiliated with the homeland ruling parties. Lobbying practices and commemoration of past 
massacres are often closely intertwined and to some extent overlapping. However, we suggest 
making an analytical distinction between the two types of activities. On the one hand, GRP can 
focus on political strategies and committed lobbying practices that are linked to secessionist claims 
or claims for restorative justice, and that aim to establish strong contacts in host country political 
circles and transnational advocacy networks. On the other hand, GRP can emphasize 
commemoration practices and aim at cultural production or have more of a social function that, for 
instance in the diaspora context, creates a symbolic connection between the diaspora community 
and the homeland. Whereas in both cases GRP draw from collective memory and can provide 
means for identity construction, in the latter this does not require involvement in local political 
systems. Although they could be investigated under the same umbrella term of genocide recognition 
politics, we argue that they require closer scrutiny if the underlying political, economic and social 
drivers are to be understood. 
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Kurds, the Anfal campaign and the issue of recognition 
The Kurdish-speaking population – estimated between 25-40 million people in the Middle 
East – is spread across four states (Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria) as well as dispersed in diaspora 
communities mainly across Europe and North America.19 In the course of the twentieth century, 
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran adopted differing approaches to minority relations, from diverse assimilation 
policies to genocidal measures, namely in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime.20 Great numbers of 
Kurdish refugees and asylum seekers migrated to Europe and elsewhere from the mid 1980s as a 
result of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988). Although small waves of Kurdish migration occurred in the 
1970s with Kurdish intellectuals fleeing Iran and Iraq, the most significant wave of migration 
occurred during the mid 1980s and onwards21, namely in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991. 
When one examines particular political events, it is noticeable that the Kurdish diaspora movements 
toward Europe were fuelled particularly by the Iraqi state’s destruction of thousands of Kurdish 
villages between 1975 and 1991. These included Saddam Hussein’s notorious Anfal campaign, with 
gas bombings specifically targeting Kurdish villages. In 1991, the failed revolt against the Iraqi 
state in the aftermath of the Gulf War resulted in two million Kurds fleeing to the mountains and 
toward Iran and Turkey. The 1994-1997 civil war between the main Kurdish parties, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) created instability in region, 
and by the late 1990s thousands of refugees from Iraqi Kurdistan had fled to neighbouring 
countries, Europe and the United States.22 Current estimates of the Kurdish population in Europe 
place the number of Kurdish-speakers at between roughly 850,000 and 1.3 million, with the great 
majority residing in Germany. Sizeable Kurdish communities also live in the United Kingdom, 
France and the Nordic countries.23 
During the Iran-Iraq war, the military operations against the Kurds that came to be known as 
the Anfal campaign took place in 1988. After 1980, Iraqi garrisons were transferred to the Iranian 
front, which allowed the Kurdish peshmerga military forces, to gain influence in the region. In 
1983, the KDP – led by Masoud Barzani – allied with Tehheran, followed by a swift operation by 
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Iraqi troops to abduct between 5–8,000 men belonging to the Barzani tribe. As the Middle East 
Watch report puts it: ‘the 1983 Barzani operation foreshadowed the techniques that would be used 
on a much larger scale during the Anfal campaign.’24 For instance, the first campaign in February 
1988 began with attacks on the PUK’s headquarters and the villages nearby, and the massacre of 
Halabja is often references as a reaction of the Hussein’s regime to the peshmerga’s attempt to take 
control of the city in March 1988.25 Hassan al-Majid (Saddam Hussein’s cousin, also known as 
‘Chemical Ali’) organized forced deportations as well as systematic chemical attacks on Kurdish 
villages located in Northern Iraq, under the commands of his cousin, resulting in some 1.5 million 
Kurds being ‘resettled’. The attacks are said to have destroyed ‘the entire social and economic 
texture of the affected regions’26 with effects of the atrocities still visible today. Altogether, the 
eight military offensives, seven of which targeted regions controlled by the PUK, physically 
destroyed 3,000 villages, killing approximately 150,000–180,000 people and leaving more than 
180,000 missing.27 The Anfal campaign took place in three consecutive phases, the last of which 
included a chemical attack on the city of Halabja in 1988, where approximately 7,000–8,000 people 
perished in a single day.28 The most horrific event of the Anfal campaign, Halabja became 
profoundly emblematic in the collective memory of Kurds and an important memorial site.29 Local 
policy-makers quickly placed Halabja in the centre of the framing of the Anfal campaign as 
genocide. Right after the Halabja massacre during a visit to the United States, Jalal Talabani (then 
Iraqi Kurdish leader and now current president of Iraq), referred to Halabja to ground claims for 
Kurdish self-rule.30 A no-fly zone to protect the civilian population in the KRI was established in 
1991 and a year later the KRG was founded with the first democratically elected parliament. Under 
pressure from the United States, the Iraqi Government withdrew its political and military presence 
from the KRI. After the invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, the massacre of Halabja was used by then 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, as evidence that Saddam Hussein had used weapons of mass 
destruction.31 
  
     10 
In 2006, Saddam Hussein’s trial started in the Iraqi High Tribunal.32 Besides war crimes, he 
was charged for genocide against Kurds (with a special reference to Halabja), but the prosecution 
had only presented half of the case by the time he was executed. ‘Chemical Ali’ was also 
condemned to death in 2006 after he was found guilty of having orchestrated the Halabja bombing, 
yet the two were never officially found guilty of genocide by the Iraqi High Tribunal, which 
dropped the charges following the executions. In 2010, the Iraqi High Criminal Court recognized 
the Halabja massacre as an act of genocide. However, the tribunal has since then become a highly 
politicized, being criticized for proceeding in a fait accompli manner without taking international 
human rights norms into consideration and without turning the case over to an international court.33 
Additionally, while the Iraqi National Assembly has recognized Anfal as genocide, the Kurds have 
received no official apology, which has led to further disappointment for victims.34  
In the meantime, the Iraqi Kurdish region has gained international recognition and has 
experienced rapid economic growth, partially in form of foreign investments. Compared to the rest 
of the country, it has been thus highly political stabile and relatively prosperous. As Hautaniemi and 
colleagues35 observe, the last decade has seen ‘Kurdish society … transformed extremely rapidly 
from a largely agrarian-based, highly regulated, and state owned economy to a market economy’. 
More recently, however, the neoliberal transformation of the Iraqi Kurdish economy and the related 
investment boom has weakened due to endemic corruption and the on-going war against ISIS. The 
2005 constitution paved the way for guaranteed federalism for Iraqi Kurdistan and the following 
year PUK and KDP signed an accord to reunify the Kurdish provinces under one administration.36 
 However, disputes between the parties continue to simmer, and the relations with Baghdad 
government remain fragile. At the same time, KRI is clearly in the process of nation-building after a 
long period of experiencing contested sovereignty.37 Despite the ongoing crises and the permanent 
state of emergency in the region, the battle against ISIS and conflicts with the central government of 
Iraq, the commitment of the KRG to nation-building has not diminished. In early 2016, it 
announced its intention to hold an independence referendum soon.38 Not only does it have a 
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national anthem and a Kurdish-speaking majority with a common history, it has also managed to 
gain significant autonomy from the central government. In short, the KRG is in the process of 
constructing a national myth of rebirth from the ashes. 
 
Legitimization of rule and remembering in the context of nation-building 
The GRP undertaken in a post-genocide context by the targeted group can become a barrier 
to peaceful inter-ethnic relations and lead to sectarian violence.39 For instance, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the national court system as well as the Gacaca courts were put in 
place with the latter seeking to distribute justice, foster reconciliation at the grassroots level and to 
prevent further division.40 Ihsan41 suggests that in the case of Anfal, the international recognition of 
genocide would mean officially recognizing the link between chemical weapons and genocide. He 
suggests that political calculations have actually deprived the victims of Anfal of compensation and 
restorative justice, and that the absence of a Yugoslav- or Rwandan-style international tribunal has 
meant Iraqi society has not been able to heal its divides. 
Besides inter-ethnic relations, GRP can be a highly contentious issue at the international 
level. For instance, in the case of Armenian genocide, Turkey has refused to recognize the atrocities 
and denied all demands regarding territorial or monetary compensation, which has also created 
friction in its diplomatic relations. This is, however, where the Iraqi Kurdish case differs from the 
Armenian and Rwandan examples. Most of the perpetrators have been tried and punished by the 
Iraqi High Tribunal, the Iraqi central government has acknowledged these atrocities as genocide and 
both Iraqi politicians and diplomatic staff attend annual Halabja commemoration events. Therefore, 
the question of genocide does not play a major role in creating sectarian divisions within Iraq, as it 
might outside its borders. The Iraqi central government was even one of the main stakeholders of 
the erection of the Halabja Monument at The Hague.42 However, ethno-national groups can use 
GRP to demonstrate the impossibility of peaceful co-existence and to seek separation based on a 
supposed existential threat to their group.43 The question therefore emerges; to what extent are GRP 
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in the case of Anfal campaign linked to aspirations for greater self-determination? And how are 
GRP related to nation-building mechanisms in the KRI? 
The memory of Halabja and Anfal campaign remains highly salient in the Kurdish region.44 
As Mlodoch claims, it is ‘suspended over the people and the region like a big cloud’ to the extent 
that people continue to divide their lives into two periods: before and after Anfal.45 However, the 
interpretations of the Anfal campaign points toward contesting narratives and fragmented 
memories. The official narratives have shifted from referencing the Anfal as catastrophe in the 
1990s to principally employing the concept of ‘genocide’ in the post-2003 period. 46 Fischer-Tahir 
discusses the ‘scientification of Anfal’ and suggests that ‘Anfal was reduced to a symbol and a 
dense narrative in the 1990s nationalist discourse dominated by the ruling party’.47 This echoes 
Tejel’s observations of the post-2003 KRI: ‘Following the establishment of the autonomous region 
in Iraqi Kurdistan, numerous studies, as well as political actors have tried to prove that the Kurds 
have been the victims of a systematic genocidal policy since the creation of the Iraqi state.’ 48  
According to various authors, this has caused two major problems. The first is the creation 
of a hegemonic political discourse that narrates a story of ‘national suffering’ but in the end has 
overlooked the narratives of Anfal victims and survivors at the local level. Emphasizing the 
victimhood of the entire Iraqi-Kurdish nation it has also foregrounded the martyrdom of the 
peshmergas (while obscuring their defeat and undermined masculinity) in a way that does not fit the 
official narrative. The martyred peshmerga have thus become powerful symbols of the Kurdish 
liberation movement, and have been used to legitimize the local government. 49 Furthermore, the 
civil war between the main Kurdish parties in the 1990s has been downplayed in official statements, 
as it could have the potential to deconstruct the hegemonic Kurdish nationalist victim narratives. 
Second, this official political discourse has neglected the role played by the Kurdish paramilitary 
groups (jash) that participated in Ba’ath regime’s efforts to suppress Kurdish dissent.50 More recent 
accounts of Kurdish militia collaboration with the Ba’ath regime, however, have focused attention 
on Anfal survivors’ claims and have seen collaborators’ amnesties withdrawn.51 How the collective 
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memory has been instrumentalized has become more evident particularly in the post-2003 period. 
For instance, as Tejel shows, even the ‘textbooks produced by the KRG were modified, if not 
reconstructed, after the fall of the regime to reflect the Kurds’ vision of nation-building’. The Anfal 
campaign has became a highly salient milestone in Kurdish nationalist narrative.52  
In 2006, the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs was established by the Kurdish Regional 
Government.53 According to one of its former ministers, Aram Ahmed Mohamed54, the ministry’s 
key tasks are to cooperate with other authorities to provide care for the families of the victims and 
the disappeared and those who were political prisoners during the Saddam regime, to search for the 
disappeared and return bodies found in mass graves to family members, as well as to hold 
commemorative events.55 Such activities are locally orientated in the sense that they emphasize the 
provision of care for the victims of Anfal and aim to keep the memory of it alive.56 However, 
Mlodoch argues that victim narratives have been excluded from the official narratives on Anfal and 
Halabja, and that the victims’ and survivors’ immediate needs have been largely ignored. As she 
further elaborates: ‘Since their claims and needs remain unaddressed and their voices are excluded 
from public discourse, they feel increasingly disappointed and alienated from both the Iraqi national 
and the Kurdish regional political process.’ This disappointment in return has deepened the 
psychological suffering of the Anfal survivors.57 
Disputes surfaced when the monument of Halabja martyrs was established in 2003.58, It 
received fierce criticism from the local population, and ended up being destroyed by a group of 
citizens, who criticized the KRG for having made political hay out of the memory of the massacre, 
while declining to provide meaningful support to the local population. Indeed, Watts suggests that 
‘Halabja was the centrepiece of the broader institutionalization of Kurdish martyrdom embodied in 
the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs’ and further continues that: ‘all constituted authorities’ 
efforts to control how Halabja would be remembered and represented in the public sphere and to 
ensure that it could be used to reinforce the notion of Kurdish rule as the only appropriate form of 
government’.59 Similarly, Mlodoch argues that ‘the current political debate is characterized by 
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competing and conflicting memories and narratives of the past and present with victimhood of past 
and current violence being a significant argument to legitimate power claims on the national 
level’.60 
Moreover, scholars also suggest that genocide recognition and secession are intertwined. For 
instance, Ihsan61 argues that: ‘The Kurds realized that if they wanted to build a new country and 
break the cycle of violence in which they lived, they had to deal with their past; further, they needed 
to investigate the genocides committed against them in the awareness that recognition would 
smooth the road to self-determination and independence that the Kurds have always travelled.’ 
Fischer-Tahir also observes that she finds more and more references to the Jewish and Armenian 
cases in Kurdish documents. They follow the argument that the Jewish population suffered 
genocide, which then became internationally recognized, and which led to the creation of the Jewish 
nation-state.62 However, the opposite argument has also been made, for instance by Gavriel 
Mairone an attorney representing nearly 4,000 Anfal victims. He argues that it is not genocide 
recognition that will enable self-determination, but rather Kurdish independence that will enable the 
Kurds to bring Anfal to international courts for compensation when an eventual Kurdish state joins 
the United Nations.63 The accounts of interviewed members of diaspora organizations also resonate 
with this observation, whereas KRG officials avoided referring to any secessionist claims.  
The legitimization of rule takes place at the KRG level, and does not for the moment being 
extend to secessionist claims, contrary to other cases of GRP in Akhbazia, South Ossetia or 
Kosovo, where the circumstances for such claims have been favourable.64 A close examination of 
the official statements shows that the KRG emphasizes the need to raise awareness and increase the 
visibility of Kurds and the Kurdish cause in the international arena, also evident in its efforts to 
lobby for the recognition of Anfal as genocide via its offices in European countries. A KRG 
minister, Sabah Ahmed Mohamed, lists seven desired objectives tied to genocide recognition, 
including among others raising awareness,65 prevention of similar crimes in future, and – most 
interestingly – ‘enforcing the move from the concept of absolute sovereignty to conditional 
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sovereignty’. By conditional sovereignty it is meant that ‘states must accept the responsibility to 
protect their people or face intervention by the international community.’ 66  
Interviews with the KDP’s head of Foreign Office, Hemin Hawrami, and the Head of the 
Department of Foreign Relations, Falah Mustafa Bakir, also confirm these aims. For instance, 
Hemin Hawrami, accounts that they seek international recognition because the Anfal campaign was 
also a crime against humanity, thus resonating with the KRG’s framing of the politics of genocide 
recognition as a way of preventing of further genocides. He further suggests that had Halabja been 
recognized as an act of genocide a decade ago, no party would have dared to use poison gas in Syria 
today.67 Falah Mustafa Bakir also states that any effort to commemorate events creates awareness of 
the plight of Kurds and contributes to prevention of future atrocities in the region. Calling for 
justice and awareness, the KRG’s official website states: ‘It is imperative that the world recognizes 
that genocide was perpetrated over decades, culminating in the Anfal operation of February to 
September 1988, and that we send out a clear message that genocide should never happen again.’68 
Indeed according to scholars such as Tejel and Fischer-Tahir, this is exactly the message that the 
KRG aims to convey. The genocide happened while the world was watching and thus withouth 
further effort the risk of recurrence will remain.69 Therefore, as Mlodoch70 suggests: ‘The Anfal and 
the memory of [it] has a high importance for the Kurdish political elite and society in the process of 
legitimating their claims for autonomy, for power-sharing on a national level and for international 
guarantees of Kurdish rights’. Note? 
The KRG’s official documents formulate demands for genocide recognition within the 
framework of human rights, restorative justice, and genocide prevention instead of referring to an 
eventual secession. Although the official statements mention that the Iraqi High Tribunal as well as 
the Iraqi Parliament have already recognized these atrocities as genocide, the reason why further 
official recognition is needed remains unarticulated. The reasoning behind the recognition demands 
are articulated in the frame of human rights and genocide prevention that speaks to a certain caution 
in terms of international relations, visible in the formulation of Anfal in the websites of KRG 
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representation bureaux. For instance, the section ‘Why the need for recognition’ on the website of 
the KRG representation in the United Kingdom makes no reference to secession, but concludes with 
the following sentence: ‘the people of Kurdistan are forward-looking and want to build their lives 
and their country. But they cannot forget what befell their people. Help their voice to be heard.’71 
However, this is not to say that the current discourses of the Anfal campaign and the call for its 
recognition as genocide could not be instrumentalized at some particular moment and employed as 
a justification for secession at the international arena.  
We argue that the official statements of the KRG that deal with Anfal campaign and 
genocide recognition need to be understood within the frame of the ongoing nation-building 
processes that are domestically orientated. For the time being the initiatives neither evoke secession 
nor explicitly link the genocide recognition to aspirations towards independence. For instance, none 
of the interviewed politicians mentioned a link between genocide recognition and secession, 
although President Masoud Barzani’s speech on the 33rd anniversary of the Barzani killings72 point 
out to a potential emerging link between the genocide and independence: ‘independence is the truest 
loyalty to the blood of Anfal martyrs’.73 Nevertheless, the formulation of GRP and the related 
discourses in the case of Anfal can be considered a part of the nation-building mechanisms and a 
part of a repertoire of tools to ascertain the legitimacy of KRG rule. Furthermore, such discourse on 
Anfal enhances the sense of belonging to an ethnic community that has experienced a ‘collective 
trauma’. With the relative economic wealth and societal stability that the region has experienced in 
the post-2003 period until very recently, the fact of contrasting the situation in the late 2000s to late 
1980s and the oppressive measures by Hussein’s regime allow constructing a ‘rise from the ashes’- 
kind of success story. This can then galvanize nationalist feelings and enable the political actors to 
rekindle calls for unity. Employing Anfal as the common reference point for a traumatic history also 
allows the bridging of the diaspora and the KRG bureaux of representation via coordinated 
commemoration practices and provides platforms for political claims-making aimed at salient actors 
in host societies’ political circles. 
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Anfal as the ‘chosen trauma’ 
The KRG’s official statements and the interviewees’ accounts on Anfal not only emphasized 
increasing awareness, prevention of further massacres and reconciliation as central reasons for 
recognition, but they also put forth the significance of remembering. Indeed, the formulation of 
genocide recognition initiatives and the evoking of the Anfal campaign focuses on commemorative 
practices that evoke past injustices, and to local-level rehabilitation practices for victims, although 
their impact can be contested.74 In this respect, we contend that Vamik Volkan’s theory of chosen 
trauma is valid for the Iraqi Kurdish case. It refers to ‘a shared mental representation of a traumatic 
past event during which the large group suffered loss and/or experienced helplessness, shame and 
humiliation in a conflict with another group’.75 According to Volkan, the chosen trauma changes 
function and becomes more than a memory over generations — it unites and becomes a significant 
group marker of ethnic identity that can then be reactivated by political leaders to reconfirm such 
identity. In his words, ‘chosen traumas are recalled during the anniversary of the original event, and 
the ritualistic commemoration helps to bind the members of the large group together.’76, The Iraqi 
Kurds’ chosen trauma is, in this view, the Anfal campaign, as these constitute a crucial part of the 
nation-building narrative. More importantly, contrary to other cases where the trauma and suffering 
of mass atrocities have become a ‘chosen amnesia’77 used to move forward and facilitate 
reconciliation, the interviewees’ considered international recognition as fundamental to 
reconciliation. The politics of genocide recognition are thus articulated and formulated in relation to 
traumatic events that structure collective memory both in the homeland context as well as in the 
diaspora. Yet the interpretations of such traumatic events and how they are employed to make 
political claims can vary between homeland political actors and diaspora members.  
Anderson Paul78 argues that genocidal memory is important in providing a cohesive group 
ideology, both in the homeland and in diaspora. Catic79 also refers to Volkan’s ‘chosen trauma’ to 
show how the collective memory of genocide can be used as a mechanism to keep the diaspora and 
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homeland connection intact. A shared experience of collective suffering and its legacy can help to 
maintain and even strengthen a link between the diaspora and the national identity as constructed in 
homeland context. On the other hand, the interpretation of the genocidal persecution between the 
local population and the diaspora can vary significantly. For instance, the massacres that form the 
focal point of GRP may have led to mass migration from the homeland and to the formation of a 
diaspora community in exile that now actively engages in genocide recognition politics. The 
diaspora members might have first-hand experience of the massacre and it can become narrated as 
part of the exiled condition and reasons that led to it. As Khayati suggests: ‘By regularly evoking a 
number of salient utterances relating to discrimination, the politics of denial, assimilation, 
persecution, maltreatment, massacre, destruction, Anfal, gas attacks, forced displacement, and so 
on, the mainstream Kurdish diaspora discourse is a way not only of recalling those experiences of 
trauma and oppression in Kurdistan but also of legitimizing escaping from them’.80 In this way, the 
commemoration practices have a social and possibly a psychological function in the sense that they 
can provide legitimization for the exiled condition. 
Commemoration practices as part of genocide recognition initiatives ought to be understood 
in the context of collective identity narratives and dominant diaspora discourses that stem from 
experiences of denial, injustice and resistance. As Khayati81 suggests the ‘dominant discourse of 
victim diaspora’ can be found in ‘all Kurdish political organizations and socio-cultural institutions 
and networks in Western societies’. Narratives on traumatic events, namely of Anfal, have become 
an integral component of how (Iraqi) Kurdish diaspora organizations formulate collective identity 
narratives and employ them in representations of collective histories. In this case, the KRG 
representative to France makes an interesting remark, which shows how the discourses of Anfal 
take shape in the transnational space: ‘Have you ever seen a Kurd who is not politicized? It is not 
possible. It is not a choice. So they are all in a way are politicized. They did not choose that. We 
talk about the Kurds in France, they all arrived because of the Anfal operation’.82 Such conflation of 
the Anfal campaign with the exiled condition allows the construction of an emotionally powerful 
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narrative for diaspora members to contextualize their exiled condition, but also to take part in 
genocide recognition politics and via such practices to maintain a symbolic connection to the 
imagined homeland. 
The commemoration practices around the Anfal campaign and particularly the Halabja 
massacre take place annually, and illustrate the extent to which Anfal has become the ‘chosen 
trauma’ both in the homeland as well as within the diaspora. In the former, exile has led to the 
creation of politically active diaspora organizations, parties and groups that operate transnationally, 
while cultural and social events as well as political seminars have paved the way for diaspora 
gatherings, and genocide recognition initiatives. Besides commemoration practices, participating in 
recognition initiatives has enabled diaspora members to contribute to the homeland’s nation-
building efforts and to strengthen the ties between the diaspora organizations and homeland actors.  
 
Internationalization of the genocide recognition Ccaims for Anfal 
The Iraqi National Assembly recognized the Anfal campaign as a genocide in 2008. 
However, the KRG as well as the victims have been dissatisfied with the tribunal process. Survivors 
especially continue to demand that the Anfal campaign be recognized internationally as genocide. 
Genocide recognition in European parliaments and the official governmental approvals that follow 
can thus represent what Mlodoch calls ‘a symbolic closure’ for the Kurds.83 Furthermore, survivors 
have demanded that international companies that supplied chemical gas to Saddam’s regime be 
brought to justice. Mlodoch argues that reconstructing these traumatic memories and making them 
part of one’s identity can pave the way for reaching closure with past events. While impunity of the 
perpetrators may inhibit this process and prolong suffering, punishing the perpetrators may facilitate 
healing and moving on from the past.84  
Besides the KRG and its bureaux of representation, diaspora organizations also play a role 
in the process of pushing these claims further. Diaspora Kurds — mainly from Iraq, but also from 
elsewhere — have mobilized (with some success) in different host countries to lobby for the 
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recognition of Anfal as genocide.85 Wide-scale protests were organized against the Saddam Hussein 
regime and to contest the situation of Kurds fleeing massacres right after the Gulf War. During and 
immediately after the Anfal campaign, diaspora Kurds organized protests including marches, 
petitions, sit-ins, hunger strikes and take-overs of embassies, and highlighted the responsibilities of 
the international community to recognize the Anfal campaign as genocide. However, the Kurdish 
diaspora is far from being a homogenous and the pre-existing fragmentations within it are reflected 
in diaspora lobbying activities. Such efforts have mainly taken place in collaboration between the 
ruling parties in KRG and diaspora organizations that are affiliated with them.  
The diaspora lobbying and the coordinated efforts with the KRG bureaux of representation 
in different European countries have led to the internationalization of genocide recognition claims 
for the Anfal campaign. KRG politicians frequently organize visits to diaspora members and 
organizations to encourage more active lobbying to host country governments and parliaments.86 
These activities have not only provided means to raise awareness of the Kurds’ situation in Iraq, but 
they have also enabled the KRG and its bureaux all around the world to create platforms of 
solidarity with host-country policy-makers. For instance, in 2012, several diaspora organizations, 
including the Confederation of Kurdish Association in Europe (KON-KURD), Kurdocide Watch 
(CHAK), and the Kurdistan National Congress organized a high-profile conference, ‘The Halabja 
Genocide and Anfal Campaign’, at the European Parliament.87 A year later, a three-day exhibition 
commemorating the massacre was opened in the parliament.88 In early 2016, the Center for Kurdish 
Progress organized an event to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the massacre at the British 
Parliament.89 
As far as the international recognition is concerned, the Norwegian90 and Swedish 
parliaments formally recognised Anfal as genocide in 2012. In the case of Sweden, the passing of 
the vote was attributed to the efforts of diaspora Kurds in the country, who organized awareness 
raising campaigns and lobbied Swedish members of parliament. Kurdish diaspora in Sweden has 
been very active since the formation of the diaspora in the 1970s. There are many Kurdish-origin 
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MPs in the Swedish Parliament, and in the case of the genocide recognition, Jabbar Amin from the 
Green Party and Amineh Kakbaveh from the Leftist Party were extremely influential in creating 
massive support in their political parties despite a few rejections.91 Swedish MPs, including Fredrik 
Malm from the People’s Party (Folkpartiet) also gave support to the motion, which passed 
unanimously in the Parliament.92 Malm was also present at the 25th Anniversary of Anfal Genocide 
Conference in London alongside British, French and Norwegian politicians.  
The interviewees’ accounts foregrounded the translocal circulation of political techniques 
and discourses between homeland actors and diaspora organizations via bureaux of representation. 
They also showcased how the recognition initiatives enabled the establishment of political networks 
with local political actors, including Swedish, Norwegian or British MPs, some of them having a 
diaspora background themselves. For instance, the UK KRG representation together with Kurdish 
umbrella and student organizations coordinated their efforts to push for recognition. Furthermore, 
the KRG office has been working closely with the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Iraqi 
Kurdistan towards achieving international recognition of the Kurdish genocide. A Kurdish-origin 
MP from the Conservative Party, Nadhim Zahawi started a petition, which received more than 
27,000 signatures from British citizens and residents.93 The petition referred to the UK’s role as the 
‘promoter of international values’, while at the same time calling for recognition: 
 
We urge the Government to recognise formally the Genocide against the people 
of Iraqi Kurdistan and to encourage the EU and UN to do likewise. This will 
enable Kurdish people, many in the UK, to achieve justice for their considerable 
loss. It would also enable Britain, the home of democracy and freedom, to send 
out a message of support for international conventions and human rights. 
 
After the petition exceeded 10,000 signatures, the British Parliament voted to formally 
recognise Anfal as a genocide in 2013.94 However, to date the government has not recognized this 
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decision, and it has remained in the House of Commons with Government taking the following 
position: ‘It remains the Government’s view that it is not for governments to decide whether 
genocide has been committed in this case, as this is a complex legal question.’ Parliament was very 
hesitant even when discussing the recognition of the Armenian genocide, finally deciding upon the 
current policy of non-recognition despite the Armenian diaspora’s lobbying efforts.95 The petition 
and its passing to the House of Commons can still be considered a success although the KRG 
representative to London states that parliamentary recognitions are not the ultimate aim because the 
real aim is to get the genocide bills recognized by governments, which is yet to take place.96 The 
KRG also has a genuine interest in contributing to genocide prevention efforts by raising awareness 
of the atrocities and their consequences against civil populations, especially in the region that is 
prone to spiralling violence. Therefore, even if the KRG cannot receive an official recognition as 
desired, they can still use the visibility gained and parliamentary acknowledgements in negotiations 
for military support from international community, as they have done with Germany, while 
pursuing a self-defence war against the ISIS. 
At times, political interests and aims have become favourable to recognition claims. 
Emphasizing Saddam Hussein’s crimes was in the interests of both Iraqi Kurds and the British 
political circles, who wished to portray the invasion of Iraq in a positive light. The (partial) 
recognition enabled British political parties to provide an alternative story about the invasion of 
Iraq. For instance, the former KRG representative to the UK, Bayan Sami Abdulrahman refers to 
the invasion as ‘Kurdish liberation’, while the Kurdish-origin parliamentarian Nadhim Zahawi 
endorses Tony Blair as the ‘liberator of the Kurds’.97 On the other hand, Gary Kent, the director of 
the APPG on Iraqi Kurdistan writes: ‘The UK is seen by the KRG as a partner of choice and now 
more and more Brits realize that this has to be a two-way street’.98 In this way, lobbying activities 
also strengthen diplomatic relations between the two parties and open channels for paradiplomacy, 
particularly in cases the political interests happen to coincide.  
On the other hand, in the Netherlands, where the KRG does not have official representation, 
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the political parties such as the KDP, PUK and the Gorran Party have mobilized separately via 
affiliated diaspora organizations. This fragmentation among the political parties is also reflected in 
diaspora intra-group relations, which can eventually hinder strong mobilization as a united front. 
The lack of the KRG representation in the Netherlands has also made it harder for the diaspora 
organizations to come together for lobbying activities. Despite these constraints, a Kurdish initiative 
in the Hague — with the help of the Socialist Party — gained momentum in 2012-2013 and 
managed to collect 2,000 signatures for Halabja commemoration monument to be erected in the 
Hague. With the involvement of the Iraqi Embassy and several Kurdish diaspora organizations, the 
project was organized as a citizens’ initiative. Finally, the monument saw the daylight in the garden 
of the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons building, the location surely being 
symbolically significant. The monument gathers Dutch politicians from different parties, Iraqi 
diplomats, journalists, activists and Kurdish diaspora members in an annual commemoration event 
for Halabja victims. It has brought visibility to Halabja and sustained interest in the plight of the 
Kurds in the city, where the international court and organizations are centered. This is significant in 
the sense that the transnational advocacy networks that have been created via Anfal-related 
lobbying activities (among others) have also enabled discussing other politically pertinent issues. 
Notably, the existing contacts between political parties and networks have enabled discussing 
convoys of military support to the KRG in its combat against ISIS.  
However, when asked about the possibility of genocide recognition, members of the KDP 
affiliated diaspora organization in the Netherlands did not seem optimistic about the near future. 
According to the president of the Kurdish-Dutch Business Club (KDBC), Bakir Lashkari, Kurds 
need to take the Jewish diaspora as a role model and strive for unity despite political differences 
when lobbying for Anfal’s recognition, arguing that it is more of a human rights issue than a 
political one. He points to the fragmentations within the diaspora as a barrier for further 
collaboration.99 Interviewed KDP representatives in the Netherlands also seconded this view.100 An 
MP from the Socialist Party, Harry van Bommel, who is usually referred to as ‘the friend of the 
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Kurds’101, recounted how the fragmentation between the Kurdish political groups in the Netherlands 
surfaced in the case of the Halabja monument. He tells how the project was kept as a ‘citizen’s 
initiative’ till the end, which paved the way for successful lobbying, even though each Kurdish 
political party tried to hijack the initiative.102 This also points towards the political struggles and 
divisions that exist among diaspora organizations that are affiliated with the ruling parties, and to 
the fact that the political stakes are high, as these initiatives might eventually pave the way for the 
official recognition in the Netherlands, as argued by van Bommel. When asked about the impact of 
a potential recognition, he said: 
 
first of all, it would be an important step towards recognising the Kurdish entity. 
It would mean a lot to other European countries because they are all looking at 
each other … . It would improve the diplomatic relations between the KRG and 
the Netherlands. It would strengthen the position of the Kurdish community in 
the Netherlands.103 
 
Interviewees from KDP-affiliated diaspora organization in the Netherlands, business 
associations and KOMKAR104 also mentioned that no political party would bring Kurdish-related 
issues to the parliament without the agreement of Turkey as they have a very large Turkish-origin 
voter base. This was especially the case for the Labour Party that has several MPs of Turkish origin. 
There was a strong belief that Turkey would protest any decision that would benefit the Kurds. 
Another factor that was mentioned for the delay of even having a parliamentary debate on the 
recognition was the eventual liability of Dutch companies and the risk of having to pay 
compensations. Indeed, in 2005, a Dutch citizen, Frans Van Anraat, was prosecuted by the Dutch 
Court for selling chemicals that were used to produce poison gas, then later employed in Halabja. 
Van Anraat was found guilty of genocide charges, but the charges were dropped in the Court of 
Appeals in the Hague. Instead he was charged ‘for complicity in the participation of violations of 
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the laws and customs of war for selling chemicals to Saddam Hussein’s regime’ and sentenced to 
seventeen years of imprisonment.105 Interviewees underlined that he was not the only Dutch 
businessman, who was involved in selling chemicals to the Iraqi Regime and that there were more, 
who were yet to be prosecuted.106 Moreover, the fact that a well-known Dutch oil company had 
greater invested interests in Baghdad than the Iraqi Kurdish Region was mentioned by interviewees 
from the KDP representation as a possible reason for the Netherlands’ reluctance to recognize Anfal 
as a genocide.  
The Netherlands is not the only country, where the question of liability for the Anfal 
massacres has been raised. In 2013, Iraqi Kurds in France sued French companies for their 
involvement in the chemical attack; namely, having supplied Saddam Hussein with poison gas in 
1988.107 Also the complicity of German corporations in providing chemicals to Saddam has been 
debated and questioned.108 Secret government documents that were revealed in 2011 in Britain 
showed the extent to which the British government was reluctant to take action against Hussein due 
to the involvement of a British firm in a trade agreement.109 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization (UNPO) also reports the following:  
 
The extent to which Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Britain was responsible 
for arming Saddam’s Iraq was revealed in 2011, when secret government files 
from 1981 were made public. The documents show Thatcher's approval of large 
military contracts with Iraq and her turning a blind eye to ongoing private sales 
of allegedly ‘non-lethal’ military equipment. According to the documents, she 
sought to ‘exploit Iraq’s potentialities as a promising market for the sale of 
defence equipment’.110  
 
In this regard, diaspora Kurds have also criticized the involvement and responsibility of their 
host countries (and companies operating within such countries) in the massacre in question, thus at 
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times pushing towards genocide recognition while asserting the responsibility of their host societies. 
According to Kendal Nezan, the head of the Kurdish Institute in Paris, it was France that brought 
the issue of Anfal to the international attention. He posits that once Iraqi authorities recognized it as 
genocide, it should not have been too challenging to have it recognized elsewhere as well. Also a 
member of the KRG representation to France considers the official recognition of genocide unlikely 
in near future due to political reasons, although France was involved in the creation of a no-fly 
zone. The KRG representation in France has managed to bring visibility to Anfal by soliciting MPs 
from different political parties and raising media visibility via Le monde and Herald Tribune.111 
However, pushing for the recognition, according to Kendal, remains the KRG’s duty more than the 
diaspora’s.112 
Coinciding with the interviews mentioned above, four victims of Halabja came to France to 
sue two French companies due to their supply of poison gas to Saddam Hussein in 1988. According 
to the victims’ lawyer, who was representing more than seven hundred victims at the time, more 
than twenty French companies were involved in trade with Hussein’s regime.113 Nezan mentions the 
Holocaust victims as an example citing that they even managed to sue railways companies for the 
damages and this could be exemplary for the Kurdish demands. More cases are reported to have 
been opened in Germany and the Netherlands,114 which can also partially explain Germany’s 
reluctance to take steps towards recognition. The German parliament has condemned the atrocities 
against Kurds, but has not to this date officially referred to Anfal as a genocide. The Kurdish 
interviewees considered this unlikely as German companies have been accused to sell poison gas to 
the Saddam’s regime.115 Simultaneously, various NGOs, such as WADI, have attempted to push 
Germany for recognition of responsibility, but no considerable progress has been made so far.116  
As discussed above, many European companies have supplied chemical gas or other 
weapons that enabled the Iraqi regime to pursue a genocidal attack against the Kurds, which raises 
serious questions of liability. Simultaneously, the international community’s approach often seems 
to consist of taking the position that instead of governments, only a judicial body can make such 
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decisions on the recognition claims.117 The lobbying efforts have only turned out to be successful 
when there has been visible leadership by the KRG or when the diaspora members and 
organizations have acted in a unified manner ignoring the underlying ideological differences, and 
when the political interests have coincided. Nevertheless, it can be said that the genocide 
recognition efforts have been internationalized due to active diaspora lobbying. More importantly, 
the politics of genocide recognition have enhanced the KRG’s paradiplomacy ability and enabled 
Kurdish political actors to establish strong contacts in host country political circles and 
transnational advocacy networks. 
 
Conclusions 
In this article, we have examined the framework in which the politics of genocide 
recognition emerged and diffused in the case of the Anfal campaign and how they relate to issues of 
secession, legitimization of Kurdish self-rule in the KRI, and commemoration. We have argued that 
the KRG’s claims for recognition of Anfal as a genocide need to be situated in the context of the 
current nation-building processes, as this is very likely to move towards a quest for self-
determination. We suggest that the Anfal campaign has become the ‘chosen trauma’ that serve 
domestically to underwrite a sense of shared history and a collective belonging to a nation that has 
fallen victim to genocidal persecution. The interviewed KRG politicians articulated claims for 
genocide recognition without alluding to secession, yet the official discourse on Anfal has been 
used to legitimize KRG self-rule in the context of Iraq’s post-2005 structure of political federalism. 
This does not rule out the scenario that provided the political circumstances in the region become 
favourable to Kurdish independence, Anfal-related narratives can be instrumentalized and 
employed to justify secessionist claims.  
Second, we have shown how the claims for Anfal being recognized as a genocide have been 
internationalized via the efforts of KRG bureaux of representation and diaspora organizations. They 
are articulated through human rights and justice-based arguments, yet they also need to be 
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understood in the context of the ongoing nation-building processes in the KRI, to be able to assess 
the underlying political drivers. Indeed, it can be argued that genocide recognition politics are not 
only being used to legitimize local rule in the KRI, but they bring legitimacy to Kurdish actors and 
strengthen their diplomatic relations outside the Kurdish region. Commemoration events serve to 
raise awareness of past atrocities in host societies, and more importantly operate as platforms to 
create and foster transnational advocacy networks between the triad of homeland, host society and 
diaspora organizations affiliated with the homeland political parties. Efforts for recognition enable 
the government to contribute to nation-building initiatives while at the same time keeping the 
diaspora-homeland bonds intact. Furthermore, a genocidal memory of Anfal as a ‘chosen trauma’ is 
nurtured in the homeland context, as well as in the diaspora, thus providing an emotionally 
powerful narrative to take part in GRP.  
The recognition of Anfal as a genocide is highly complex and politically sensitive in 
Europe, where large Kurdish diaspora communities reside. The issues of liability and indirect 
involvement in Anfal campaign by several host societies hinder host states’ willingness to recognize 
the massacres as genocide. Whereas the host societies provide political liberties to mobilize and to 
engage in GRP, the actual recognition of certain massacres as genocide can be further complicated 
or predicated upon the (in)direct involvement of host countries in the massacre in question. 
Although successful at the parliamentary level, with few exceptions genocide bills have yet to pass 
the governmental level, mostly for reasons related to avoiding legal liability for arming the Saddam 
regime. Therefore, the success of recognition in a few parliaments remains largely symbolic rather 
than a development that would bring justice and material reparations to the victims. It appears that 
genocide recognition is treated as a political matter that involves strategic calculations and the 
dangerous terrain of liability — rather than solely as an issue of human rights.  
The recognition by the international community could surely be instrumentalized towards 
demands for earned sovereignty in the near future. However, what seems to be more crucial for the 
KRG at this stage is the process of consolidating their institutionalized status via genocide 
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recognition initiatives, which allows creating better relations with European politicians, human 
rights activists and parliaments, enhancing the KRG’s paradiplomacy ability, and forming channels 
to better economic, political and social relations with the above-mentioned actors. The diaspora as a 
transnational non-state entity provides a significant extension to the lobbying practices at the 
international arena and is able to make more direct claims for recognition by host societies 
compared to the KRG, which holds a semi-state status. In addition to commemoration practices, 
skilfully executed GRP can create waves of solidarity with wider segments of host societies’ 
politicians, civil society organizations and human rights activists. These (transnational) networks 
and how they are contextually configured also determine whether actors engaging in GRP, be they 
diaspora organizations, members or homeland actors, are successful in their claims for recognition. 
Due to the lack of international recognition of Anfal as a genocide (and consequently the absence of 
compensation), the extent to which the symbolic support and transnational advocacy networks can 
become instrumentalized if the political circumstances become favourable for Kurdish 
independence remains to be seen.  
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